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ABSTRACT 
The article discusses the three blind spots of northern Afghanistan: water 
flow, irrigation development, and the impact of climate change. 
Consideration is given to the different data sets for the current irrigated 
areas, water resources, and future potentials according to identified 
projects in northern Afghanistan. The water accounting programme 
WEAP (Water Evaluation and Planning System) has then been applied 
to estimate the current demands for water as well as the increased 
demands resulting from climate change. 
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Introduction – The Blind Spot of Afghanistan 
So far in all the literature on the Amu Darya, Afghanistan has either 
been a blind spot in terms of its current and future irrigated area and 
water demands or, depending on the author, estimated water demands 
vary enormously. Generally, authors only consider the increase of 
irrigated areas and ignore the effects of climate change. Given the 
uncertainties, it is difficult to provide accurate estimates of future 
demand. A similar blind spot applies to the amount of water which 
originates in Afghanistan and which is then utilized in the Amu Darya 
basin.  
In this paper the different data sets for current irrigated areas, water 
flow, and future potentials are reviewed. The water accounting 
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programme WEAP (Water Evaluation and Planning System) has then 
been applied to estimate both the current demand for water from a 
representative irrigated area as well as the increased demand expected to 
arise due to climate change.  
The first section of this paper provides a short introduction to the 
Amu Darya basin and the different sub-basins contributing flow from 
within Afghanistan. The second section considers the different data sets 
for flow at an individual gauging station. The third section considers the 
different perceptions concerning the current irrigated areas in 
Afghanistan, the driving forces for expansion, as well as the different 
assumptions on the potential increases in irrigated area. The fourth 
section considers the impact of climate change on demand, taking as a 
case study 111,600 ha of irrigated land surrounding the town of Emam 
Saheb in northern Afghanistan. 
Background 
The Amu Darya is the largest river in Central Asia, formed by the 
confluence of its main headwater tributaries, the rivers Vaksh and Pyanj. 
The total length from the head of the Pyanj to the Aral Sea is about 2,540 
km, although the length from the confluence with the Vaksh to the Aral 
Sea is 1,415 km.1 The catchment comprises 309,000 km2 and is shared 
between Afghanistan, Iran, and the four Central Asian Republics: 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The most 
important river, the Pyanj, originates at the glacier in the Vakjdjir Pass 
and forms the border between Afghanistan and Tajikistan. 
Ahmad and Wasiq identify three sub-basins within northern 
Afghanistan.2 The first includes minor rivers which are adjacent to the 
Amu Darya but only contribute rarely to the flow in the Amu Darya: 
these are the Khulm, Balkh, Sar-e-Pul, and Sherintagau rivers. The 
second sub-basin includes the Harrirud and Murghab rivers, but their 
links to the Amu Darya have been discontinued (Map 1). The Harrirud 
joins the Tijen river, which originates in Iran before entering 
Turkmenistan. These rivers are, however, interlinked with the Amu 
Darya system by their contribution to the flow in the Kara Kum Canal. 
This is believed to be the longest canal in the world, with a maximum 
capacity at its inlet from the Amu Darya of 600 m3/s. The third sub-basin 
contains rivers which continue to contribute flow to the Amu Darya: the 
                                            
1 J. Froebrich J and O. Kayumov, “Water management aspects of Amu Darya,” in J. C. J. 
Nihoul and al. (eds.) Dying and Dead Seas - Climatic Versus Anthropic Causes, Nato Science 
Series: IV, Earth and Environmental Sciences, Volume 36 (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
Dordrecht, 2004), pp. 49-76. 
2 M. Ahmad, M. Wasiq, Water Resource Development in Northern Afghanistan and its 
implication for Amu Darya Basin, Working Paper no. 36 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 
2004), p. 3. 
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Wakhan and Pamir as well as other rivers of Badakhshan, the Kokcha, 
and Kunduz. The emphasis here is mainly on sub-basin three, but 
consideration is also given to aspects of sub-basin one, particularly 
because, according to former Soviet plans, irrigation in these sub-basins 
depended on diversions from sub-basin three.  
 
Map 1: Amu Darya Basin 
 
Source: NeWater.  
Trends  
There are no agreements between the former Soviet Union and 
Afghanistan on water sharing for the Pyanj and Amu Darya. 
Nevertheless, Ahmad and Wasiq make reference to different protocols 
and agreements between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union signed before 
1965.3 They state, “these documents provide a treaty basis for prohibiting 
any construction work on Pyanj and Amu Darya whether by 
Afghanistan or by the other Central Asian republics (Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) without consultation, although 
Afghanistan may, without consultation, use and regulate water on 
tributaries of the Pyanj and Amu Darya.” It appears that the Soviet 
Union did not consult Afghanistan when it constructed pump stations 
serving the major canals: the Amu-Bukhara, the Amuzang, or the 
Karshi/Kashkardarya); or even the huge Kara Kum canal, or further 
down the Amudarya at the head of the Aral Sea delta the Tuyamuyun 
reservoir complex.  
In 1977 Afghanistan sent a delegation to Tashkent to prepare a water 
sharing agreement for their claim to 9 km3 from the Amu Darya; the Soviet 
                                            
3 Ibid., pp. 38-39. 
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Union only offered 6 km3, however, so no agreement was reached.4 In 
September 1987, the Scientific-Technical Council of the Soviet Ministry of 
Land Reclamation and Water Management decided on annual water-
distribution limits for the Union Republics of the Amu Darya Basin and at 
the same time created River Basin Organizations (Basseynoe Vodnoe 
Ob’edinenie, BVOs), which were responsible for managing the water 
according to the set limits. Afghanistan did not participate in this decision-
making process. Hence, the limits established in 1987 ignored claims by 
Afghanistan, and simply assumed a utilization of 2.1 km3; this was actually 
less than Afghanistan was already using in 1965, namely 3.85 km3.5 
Even to the present day, there is no agreement about how much of the 
flow in the Amu Darya originates in Afghanistan, with estimates 
indicating that some 8–21 km3 of the mean flow of the Amu-Darya 
originates in the country.  
 
Table 1 . Different Data Sets for the Amu Darya Basin 
 
Amu Darya basin (km3/year)  
State 
ICWC data6 
on river 
runoff 
International 
data7 on river 
runoff 
Set 
limits8, 9 
Officially used 
water (1993 - 
1999) 
Afghanistan  
and Iran 8.06 21.6   
Kyrgyzstan 1.5 1.6 0.4 0.2 
Tajikistan 42.6 49.6 9.5 7.3 
Turkmenistan 1.549 1.5 22 21.510 
Uzbekistan 1.2 5.1 29.6 21.6 
Aral Sea    6.1 
Total    56.7 
                                            
4 Personal conversation, Dukhovny, 2008. 
5 M. Qaseem Naimi, “Conflict Prevention and the Politics of Central Asia Water Co-
operation from the Point of View of Afghanistan,” Paper presented at a workshop 
(University of Peace: Central Asia Programme, Almaty, 2005). 
6 Source: Dukhovny (without date). 
 
7 Source: Diagnostic Study, November 2001, SPECA. 
8 Figures agreed by Protocol 566 of the Scientific-Technical Council of Ministry of Land 
Reclamation and Water Management of the USSR on September 10, 1987. 
9 Dukhovny and Sokolov (no date (b): 13) highlight the temporary nature of the set water 
allocation, by arguing “The principles of water allocation that existed in Soviet times have 
been retained for the purpose of annual planning until new regional and national water 
management strategies can be developed and adopted”   
10 Stanchin and Lerman (2006) show that Turkmenistan’s agricultural area increased from 
1,329,000 ha in 1990 to 1,843,000 ha in 2003. At the same time the total water use increased 
from 22.435 cu km to 27.958 cu km. Even though the paper does not state directly that the 
overall increase comes from the Amu Dar’ya, it is very doubtful that this increase could be 
achieved only from the smaller rivers (Murgan, Tedjen, and Atrek) and that no additional 
water was taken from the Amu Dar’ya. 
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Notwithstanding this uncertainty, there is conflicting flow data even 
for the same measuring stations (e.g., Freenet and Kunduz River Basin 
Program). 
 
Table 2. Different Data Sets for the Kunduz River at  
Pulikumri 
 
 
Irrigation Development in Afghanistan 
By the mid-1970s some 3.3 million ha had been brought under irrigation in 
the whole of Afghanistan. Currently, approximately 1.8 million ha are 
irrigated.11 Based on Development Alternatives Inc’s (DAI) 1993 analysis 
of satellite imagery, Ahmad and Wasiq concluded that 385,000 ha of this 
are within sub-basin 3, where rivers continue to contribute flow to the 
Amu Darya.12 The data indicates that 21,000 ha are inactive. The same 
value (385,000 ha) is reported by Qaseem Naimi.13 Other reports, 
however, provide different estimates which are considered to be less 
reliable. For example, Uzvod reports a current irrigated area in sub-basin 
3 of 148,000 ha (and a further 250,000 ha in sub-basin one).14 Uzvod 
provide as source of this information “the State and Prospects of Irrigation 
Development in Northern Afghanistan, drawn up by the 
Sredazgiprovodkhlopok Institute.” However, it is unclear how this 
information was derived. According to Pasquet, after the decrease of 
irrigation during the Russian war and the Mudjaheddin period, the 
irrigated area in the third sub-basin has increased once again.15  
Given the decline of irrigation during the last 40 years and the 
considerable potential for irrigation, it is not surprising that the Afghan 
                                            
11 WSS Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) 
Draft Water Sector Strategy 2008 – 2013, February 2008, p. 24. 
12 M. Ahmad, M. Wasiq Water Resource Development in Northern Afghanistan and its 
implication for Amu Darya Basin, op. cit., p. 3. 
13 M. Qaseem Naimi, “Conflict Prevention and the Politics of Central Asia Water Co-
operation from the Point of View of Afghanistan,” op. cit. 
14 SANIIRI/UZVOD Afghanistan: Water consumption, demand and forecast Contractor: 
SANIIRI    Subcontractor: UZVOD ECC Co. European Community Commission. 
General Investigations Directorate; Integration and Reinforcement of European Science; 
JAYHUN; Interstate water resource risk management: towards a sustainable future for 
the Aral basin; International Cooperation – INCO; Contract 516761, 2008. 
15 J. Pasquet, Farming systems research – Final Report, PMIS/URD, (Plaisians, France, 
2007). 
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Water Sector Strategy (WSS) is driven by ambitious plans to improve 
and/or to rehabilitate and re-establish irrigated areas.  
The Draft WSS places its emphasis on poverty reduction, and the 
strategy to achieve this relies on irrigated agriculture.16 The draft 
provides detailed information about major infrastructure projects which 
have been identified for implementation, some having already been 
started. It provides as justification for these 27 projects “the needs of the 
population and the growth in the economy of Afghanistan requiring 
continued and accelerated implementation of projects.” However, it is 
unclear whether these projects are based on old or new pre-feasibility 
studies. An earlier Draft WWS (July 2007) was itself highly critical 
about water management projects which were mentioned in the same 
2008 WSS report.  
The Draft WSS states “Sociological and environmental 
considerations tend to nullify much of the planning study selection 
criteria upon which most of these former studies have been based.”17 
Sociological considerations are, for example, the return of refugees who 
are now living in areas that were previously considered for water 
developments. These constraints are not restated in the Draft WSS of 
February 2008. Hence, it is highly doubtful whether all these 27 projects 
are feasible or as beneficial in terms of irrigated area or hydro-power 
production, or whether they might even have some negative 
consequences or cannot be implemented. 
There are not only considerations for the local communities living in 
these identified areas. Afghanistan is very well aware that any irrigation 
development in the country has implications for downstream riparian 
states, and the transboundary concerns raised:  
 
Afghanistan has been extremely reluctant in facing these 
pending confrontations, as the country has been in a total state 
of disarray with respect to evaluating its current and future 
needs. Afghanistan attention has been focused upon national 
reconstruction and the underlying problems of poverty 
alleviation. No resources have been made available to ascertain 
its physical position on determining its own requirements.18 
 
Because of Afghanistan’s innate land locked setting, virtually 
all of its major rivers drain into riparian neighbouring states. 
Transboundary concerns are intensifying along all of 
                                            
16 WSS (Draft February 2008) Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Afghanistan National 
Development Strategy (ANDS), p. 3.  
17 WSS Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) 
Draft Water Sector Strategy 2008 – 2013, July 2007, p. 20. 
18 Ibid., p. 44. 
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Afghanistan’s borders, and with the added impetus of climate 
change and diminishing glaciers, can no longer be avoided. 
Afghanistan has been preoccupied with so many other 
problems, that it has not had either adequate resources or 
sufficient time to thoroughly address the issues. Afghanistan 
requires solid support from the donor/financing community to 
study and add dimensions to both its current and future water 
requirements. Based on more clearly defined facts, Afghanistan 
can approach its neighbours on an equal footing, and can then 
participate in achieving optimal efficiency in regional 
development of these water resources.19 
 
Different estimates exist concerning the potential total area of land 
suitable for irrigation in sub-basin three. Ahmad and Wasiq claim that “a 
15–20 percent expansion would be feasible purely on technical grounds,” 
and state that it should be possible to expand the area to 443,000 ha. They 
consider, however, that this will only be achieved over the next 20 years. 
Similarly, they refer to Soviet, French, and World Bank surveys. 
According to Ahmad and Wasiq:  
 
In 1971, the State Planning Committee of the Soviet Union 
concluded that: Though most of the proposed waterworks 
would be effective, construction of a big waterworks with 
hydropower stations, generation, and capacity of which 
considerably exceeds current needs of Afghanistan, requires 
great investments. In this context, as well as taking into 
account construction of a large scale hydraulic works on 
waterways of Central Asia, the USSR only could be 
interested in developing these water and power resources not 
earlier than 20 years from now.20 
 
Uzvod identifies a potential increase of 142,700–152,900 ha to a total of 
290,500– 300,800 ha in sub-basin three. According to it, work has not 
progressed because of the deteriorating security situation, and not because 
of prioritization of the Central Asian Soviet Socialist Republics (SSRs).  
An extreme estimate by Zonn identifies the potential for sub-basin 
three as being 840,000 ha by 2020. He argues that: 
 
                                            
19 WSS (Draft October 2007) Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Afghanistan National 
Development Strategy (ANDS) Draft Water Sector Strategy 2008 – 2013, October 2007, p.  9. 
20 M. Ahmad, M. Wasiq Water Resource Development in Northern Afghanistan and its 
implication for Amu Darya Basin . op. cit.,  p. 22. 
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Irrigation of the whole free land stock of Northern 
Afghanistan (more than 1.5 million ha) is possible without the 
construction of waterworks, it will be enough to construct a 
damless water intake with water pumping in three places: 
near the confluence of the Pyanj and Vakhsh Rivers; near the 
Geshtepe outpost (opposite the mouth of the Kafirnigan 
River); near the Kelif gap. In all cases water should be 
pumped to a height of no more than 20 to 30 m.21  
 
However, it seems that Zonn did not consider the operational costs of 
pumping. If these projects need “only” to lift water by 20 to 30 m, they 
may actually be more economically feasible then the existing canal 
systems located downstream which rely on high pumped lifts: e.g., the 
ABMK Canal serving Bukhara (discharge: 270 m3/s, lift 57 m) or the 
KMK Canal serving Karshi/Kashkardarya (discharge: 350 m3/s, lift 170 
m). In the past such high lift pumping was possible because of the 
distorted economics of the Soviet Union, but in any new developments 
this will no longer apply.  
Considering abstractions, Ahmad and Wasiq (2004) argue that there 
will be a total water diversion of about 5.8 km3, or at the most 6 km3, by 
2020. According to Zonn the demand for water within the direct 
tributaries of the Amu Darya in sub-basin three will increase to 3.9 km3: 
including 1.2 to 2.5 km3 from the Kunduz; 0.3 to 0.7 km3 from the Kokcha, 
and 0.4 to 0.7 km3 from the Pyanj.  
Given the current deteriorating security situation, even in northern 
Afghanistan, it is very doubtful whether such large-scale projects, some 
relying on dams, can be implemented. Nevertheless, one EU funded 
project, “The Kunduz River Basin Project” (KRBP), is currently 
rehabilitating and constructing new intakes and water diversions in the 
Kunduz basin. Another EU funded project, “the Amu Darya Basin 
Programme” (ADBP), is surveying the Pyanj river. Hence, small-scale 
projects are already underway. Since the long-term objective of the 
Afghan WSS is poverty alleviation, and also cost recovery of the water 
delivery services, it is highly doubtful if such costly projects will ever be 
implemented. Hence, even though it might be technically feasible to 
construct pumping stations, as proposed by Zonn (and mentioned by 
Ahmad and Wasiq), it appears that the costs of lifting water to 20–30 m 
will impose an unacceptable burden on agricultural water users.22  
                                            
21 I. Zonn, “Water Resources of Northern Afghanistan and their Future Use,” Paper 
presented at workshop on water, climate and development issues in the Amu-Dar’ya 
basin, Philadelphia, PA, 2002. 
22 It is doubtful whether lifting the water 20-30 meters will be sufficient to allow the 
projects to proceed. A 20-30 km wide strip of land between the river and the potential 
irrigated areas is occupied by sand dunes (Barkhan sands) which will require an expensive 
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Taking the data of Ahmad and Wasiq as being the most reliable, and 
bearing in mind that the KRBP has already begun rehabilitating weirs 
and intakes, it is likely that the canals in their study of the Lower Kokcha 
and Gawhargan-Chardara areas will go ahead.23 From an economic 
standpoint, it is unlikely that pump stations will be constructed and from 
a social stability perspective, it is highly unlikely that dams will be 
constructed when resettlement is the priority. According to Landell Mills 
Ltd., in 2006 only 6 percent (about 600,000 Euros) of the total budget (11.6 
million Euros) had actually been spent on irrigation scheme 
rehabilitation, although 17 scheme rehabilitation works had been 
contracted. The Participatory Management of Irrigation Systems (PMIS) 
project also drew attention to the increased rice production after the 
KRBP rehabilitation. This is mainly the result of the collapse of the 
established agricultural industries (cotton and sugar beet factories in 
Taloqan and Baghlan provinces). 
Therefore, one can assume that from the projects identified by 
Ahmad and Wasiq for the Kokcha basin that 29,420 ha could be newly 
irrigated and 33,140 ha be provided with improved access to water. In the 
Kunduz basin, 3,450 ha could be newly irrigated and 24,860 ha have 
improved access to water. Finally in the Pyanj basin 41,500 ha could be 
provided with improved access to water. Hence, there would only be a 
marginal increase of newly irrigated areas, equivalent to 32,870 ha, and 
improved access to water for a further 99,500 ha. Given the current 
activities of the KRBP and the assumed activities by the ADBP, the areas 
with improved access to water are likely to increase even more. Bearing 
in mind that the preferred crop in the Kunduz basin is the cash crop rice, 
it is highly likely that at least in the Kunduz basin, rice production might 
dominate.  
If the dam projects are established in the future, given the high costs 
of pumping, and the current need for electrification for urban and rural 
areas in Kunduz, it is considered much more likely that the generated 
electricity would be used either for domestic or industrial supply, rather 
than for agriculture. In addition, with the expansion of the current 
electricity grid from Tajikistan to the south and north, it is likely that 
any surplus electricity would be sold to Afghanistan’s neighbors. 
Taking the figures mentioned by Ahmad and Wasiq and confirmed 
by Qaseem Naimi, of the 385,000 ha currently irrigated area in sub-basin 
                                                                                                                             
lined canal to be provided. It would also be difficult to prevent this from becoming 
blocked by wind blown sand leading to high maintenance costs. 
23 Landell Mills Limited (2006) 4th Progress Report (January – June 2006); TA to the 
Ministry of Energy and Water for the Implementation of the Food Security/Water 
Management Project in Kunduz, Baghlan and Takhar Provinces,  
<http://www.krbp.net/eng_reports/4th%20KRBP%20Progress%20Report%20Jan-
June%2006%2010.11.06.pdf> (August 25 2008). 
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three, it could be argued that the irrigated area might increase to 417,870 
ha. The rehabilitation projects might also lead to a change of cropping 
patterns which might further increase the demands for water. 
Influence of Climate on Water Demand 
So far, only the expansion of the irrigated area has been considered. 
Another uncertain issue is the impact of climate change on crop water 
requirements and the demand for irrigation. The analysis here considers 
the demands for water for a representative area located in sub-basin three 
which is irrigated with water from the Pyandj. The area occupies 111,600 
ha around the town of Emam Saheb in northern Afghanistan. 
The procedures used to determine crop water requirements and the 
demand for water are described in further detail in the annex to this 
paper.  
The analysis considers firstly the crop water requirements (potential 
evapotranspiration) for the existing climate (1961–1990), using 
downscaled climatic data derived by the Climate Research Unit of the 
University of East Anglia (CRU data). Secondly, the demands in 2070–
2099, using temperature rise data derived from the most recent 4th 
assessment report of the Inter-Governmental Panel on Climate Change 
(the IPCC). The monthly temperature anomalies (increases in 
temperatures) are the means of seven global circulation models included 
in the IPCC 4th assessment for the climate change scenario judged to 
most closely correspond to recent patterns of climate change in Central 
Asia, the A2 climate change scenario. This assumes a very heterogeneous 
world, with high population growth and slower economic growth than 
other climate change scenarios. The time interval 1961–1990 is a period 
used by the IPCC to represent the existing climate, whilst the future time 
interval of 2070–2099 represents a period which today’s young children 
can expect to experience in their lifetime.  
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Table 3. Potential  Evapotranspiration (Crop Water 
Requirements) for the Emam Salieb Area for 1961-1990 and 
2070-2099 
 
 
 
The annual potential crop evapotranspiration for the existing climate 
for the 111,600 ha equates to 586 million m3 (Table 3). Specifically, crops 
such as rice occupying 7,812 ha consume 85.6 million m3 (1.1 m); cotton 
occupying 3,348 ha consumes 39.9 million m3 (1.05 m), whereas winter 
wheat occupying 69,750 ha only consumes 308 million m3 (0.44 m).  
The overall demand for water (Table 4) includes more water than is 
consumed by the crops to allow for irrigation efficiencies, assumed in this 
case to be 50 percent.24 Thus the equivalent total demand for the existing 
climate is 844 million m3. Part of the crop water requirements is supplied 
by precipitation (80 percent of the P50 values in Table 5 is considered to be 
effective) but most is provided by irrigation. Specifically rice requires 
170.6 million m3 to be provided (2.2 m equivalent depth), cotton requires 
67.5 million m3 (2 m equivalent depth), whilst winter wheat only requires 
263 million m3 (0.38 m equivalent depth) reflecting both the low 
                                            
24 J. Berkof, “Irrigation in the Balkh Basin. A Preliminary Assessment,” 2004. 
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evaporation rates during the winter-spring period as well as the 
contribution of rainfall. 
The existing demand, 844 million m3 (averaging 7,564 m3/ha or 0.75 
m/ha), is relatively low because of the high proportion of winter wheat 
grown (62.5 percent of the area); this only requires 3,775 m3/ha compared 
to cotton (3 percent of the area) which requires 20,158 m3/ha (2.0 m) or 
rice (7 percent of the area) which requires 21,834 m3/ha (2.1 m).  
 
Table 4. The Demand for Water (Supplied by Irrigation):-
Emam Salieb, 1961-1990 and 2070-2099 
 
 
 
 
By 2085 the crop water requirements are predicted to rise by 9.2 
percent, from 586.2 to 643 million m3. The overall demand, taking into 
account the contribution of precipitation, is expected to rise by 11.6 
percent, from 844 to 942 million m3. 
Estimates of demand are of course quite specific to the particular 
range of irrigated crops adopted; other cropping patterns would clearly 
result in quite different values. Nevertheless, the importance of these 
findings is in revealing that demand is likely to rise by approximately 12 
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percent by 2070–2099, and this could rise even further if cultivation of 
either rice of cotton were to expand. 
For example, if the irrigated area in sub-basin three were to increase 
to e.g., 417,870 ha, then the demand for water for the existing climate 
would be 3.16 km3 rising by the period 2070–2099 to 3.52 km3. If half of the 
newly irrigated area (16,435 ha) and half of the area having improved 
access to water (49,750 ha) were to be used to cultivate rice instead of 
winter wheat, the total demand for the existing climate would rise to 4.37 
km3, increasing even further with climate change to 4.84 km3 by 2070–
2099.  
Conclusion 
Flow data 
Until now there has been no consensus on the mean flow in the Amu 
Darya which originates in Afghanistan. Estimates vary between 8.06 and 
21.1 km3 for Afghanistan as well as Iran (including all three sub-basins). 
Given that in 1977 the Afghan delegation demanded an allocation of 9 
km3 and the Soviet Union offered 6 km3, it seems that the debate 
concerning the contribution of Afghanistan to the flow in the river is not 
new and has not yet been resolved. Even existing data sets provided by 
Freenet or KRBP for the same gauging station (but for different time 
periods) vary so much as to call into question whether these apply to the 
same river.  
In the study we have not considered the issue of decreasing river 
flows. Despite all the uncertainties, there is general consensus among 
relevant scientists that the flows in the rivers will diminish.25 The 
reductions will be caused by a combination of factors: the shrinkage of 
the glaciers which are important for maintaining flow during summer; 
the rising snowline which will free up land on which plants will grow, 
and more significantly will consume water due to evapotranspiration; the 
changing patterns of flow as snow, with its slow release during melting, 
increasingly falls as rainfall encouraging rapid runoff. Estimates of flow 
reduction across the Amu Darya basin, including the Pyanj, indicate that 
these are anticipated to be within the range 10–30 percent. The implied 
                                            
25 V.G. Konovalov, “Past and prospective Change in State of Central Asian,” in Glaciers in 
Watershed and Global Hydrology, International Commission on Snow and Ice Workshop 
(Austria, August 2007), p. 47-52; D. P. Bedford, Climate Sensitivity and Water Management 
In The Upper Amu Darya Basin (PhD Thesis, the University of Colorado, Boulder, 1997); 
The First National Communication of the Republic of Tajikistan to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (Dushanbe, 2002): Chapter 4. Projected Impacts and 
Vulnerability Assessment (National Project Manager Begmurod Makhmadaliev). 
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shortage of water is certain to have a dramatic effect on plans for the 
expansion of irrigation in Afghanistan. 
Irrigation development 
The evaluation of the different projects referred to suggests that water 
use in Afghanistan is likely to increase in the future. However, most of 
these projects were based on old Soviet plans, which also reflected the 
rationale at that time, low electricity prices, and an emphasis of 
expansion of irrigation at any cost. Hence, only the capital costs of 
construction were considered. The modern rationale, cost recovery of 
provided services, and assumed realistic energy costs make it highly 
unlikely that most of the former identified projects will ever be 
implemented. 
The current deterioration of the security situation in northern 
Afghanistan also makes it unlikely that the identified dam projects will 
be implemented. As stated, returnees might have settled in the former 
surveyed areas. Therefore, it is considered that the irrigated area is 
unlikely to increase beyond about 420,000 ha, much less than the figure 
suggested by Zonn, and less than that suggested by Ahmad and Wasiq. 
The current water use of 3.07 km3 estimated by Ahmad and Wasiq is 
likely to increase with the ongoing rehabilitation of existing projects. 
With improved access to water, farmers might change from the crops 
identified by Berkhof and FAO (see Annex for more details) to the cash 
crop rice, as observed by Thomas and Wegerich. Hence, there is already a 
likely increase of demand for water from the 99,000 ha of rehabilitated 
land. With the increase in the number of smaller rehabilitation projects, 
demand will continue to increase. Taking into consideration the current 
national focus of the Afghan Water Sector Strategy, it is evident that 
these projects will affect the total water availability of water for 
downstream states.  
Climate change impacts 
The SRA2 climate change scenario considered is only one of several 
possible climate change scenarios; others predict that temperatures could 
rise even more, whilst the generality of climate change models suggests 
that precipitation will, if anything, be less. Based on the SRA2 scenario, 
our estimates of the grossed up water requirements for the likely 
increased irrigated area of 417,870 ha will rise for the assumed cropping 
pattern (based on Berkhof/FAO, see also Table 8) by 0.36 km3, from 3.16 
km3 to 3.52 km3 by 2070–2099. 
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Changing cropping patterns 
The likely increase in demand for changing cropping patterns was 
considered. This assumed that half of the newly irrigated area (16,435 ha) 
and half of the area having improved access to water (49,750 ha), equating 
to 66,185 ha, might be used to cultivate rice rather than winter wheat. The 
analysis indicated that the demand for the existing climate would rise 
from 3.16 km3 to 4.37 km3 and would increase even further with climate 
change to 4.84 km3 (by 2070–2099). This indicates that changing cropping 
patterns could be of potentially more significance than climate change. 
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Annex:  Procedure Used to  Determine the Future Demands  
for Water 
The demand for water was established for a representative area in 
northern Afghanistan (Emam Salieb) with the help of routines available 
within the software package WEAP (Water Evaluation and Planning 
System) developed by the Boston Centre of the Stockholm Environment 
Institute (http://www.weap21.org). WEAP is a water balance accounting 
programme, but in this case it was only used to facilitate the estimation 
of the demand for water for irrigation. Demands were determined for the 
climate in: 1961–1990, a period used by the International Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) as a reference for the existing climate as well as the 
climate predicted to exist in the period 2070–2099. The future time period 
was chosen as being a time which those born today can expect to 
experience in their lifetime. 
WEAP uses the FAO Cropwat routines to determine crop water 
requirements (FAO, 1998). Input data includes the mean monthly 
reference crop (grass) potential evapotranspiration, the mean monthly 
precipitation, the range and distribution of crops, as well as the crop 
growth factors. 
 
Table 5.  Climatic Data for Emam Salieb (1961-1990):-  Source 
IWMI Climate Summary Service 
 
 
 
The climatic data for the period 1961–1990 was derived for the Emam 
Salieb area from the IWMI Digital World Water Atlas (IWMI, 2007: see 
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Table 5). Values for the reference potential evapotranspiration (shown as 
ETo in Table 5) were then re-calculated using the Penman procedure 
(Penman, 1963) within the FAO “CropWat for Windows” programme 
(FAO, 1998 and Clarke et al, 2000), to ensure consistency between the 
values applicable to the existing climate and those in 2070–2099.  
The range of crops was developed from reports by Berkof (2004) and 
FAO (FAO AQUASTAT) for Afghanistan. Crop growth factors, kc 
factors, needed to convert the reference crop potential evapotranspiration 
into the individual crop water requirements were also derived from FAO 
guidelines (FAO, 1998). Both sets of values are detailed in the following 
two Tables:- 
 
Table 6. The Range and Distribution of Crops Adopted for 
Emam Salieb  
 
 
 
 
Table 7. The Crop Growth Factors (kc)  Used to Determine 
Crop Water Requirements (kc Factors Based on FAO 
Guidelines FAO, 1998) 
 
 
 
The impact of climate change was confined to considering the impact 
of rising temperatures. No attempt was made to consider changes of 
precipitation, partly because such predictions are generally considered 
unreliable; whilst in addition precipitation is low and its contribution to 
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crop water requirements minimal, particularly in relation to the water 
needing to be provided by irrigation. In the calculations, eighty percent of 
the monthly precipitation (80 percent of the P50 values in Table 5) has 
been considered to be effective in meeting crop water requirements.  
The increases in monthly temperatures due to climate change (1961–
1990 to 2070–2099) have been derived from the most recent 4th 
Assessment Report of the IPCC, for the scenario judged to correspond 
most closely to recent patterns of climate change in Central Asia (the A2 
storyline). The increases, termed anomalies, are the means of the 
monthly values based on seven global circulation models26 included in the 
IPCC 4th Assessment for the Emam Salieb area (see Table 8). 
 
Table 8. IPCC 4th Assessment: Mean Monthly Temperature 
Anomalies for the SRA2 Climate Change Scenario:  1961–1990 
to 2070–2099 for the Emam Salieb Area; Means Based on 7  
Global Circulation Models 
 
 
 
These values were then used to amend the temperatures within the 
IWMI climate file (Table 5) before being processed using the CropWat 
for Windows programme to determine revised values of reference crop 
potential evapotranspiration applicable to 2070–2099 (Table 9). 
                                            
26 CCSM3; NRM-CM3; CSIRO-MK3; ECHAM5; GFDL-CM2; HadCM3; MIROC3.2 
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Table 9. Reference Crop (Grass) Mean Monthly Potential  
Evapotranspiration Rates:-  Climate in 1961–1990 and 2070–
2099 
 
 
 
The potential evapotranspiration (the crop water requirements) for 
the individual crops grown was then determined using WEAP (Table 4). 
The demand for irrigation (Table 5) was then established by summating 
the individual elements of crop water requirement and increasing them 
(in this case by the factor 2) to allow for the reported irrigation efficiency 
of 50 percent.  
 
                                            
